See, Barry heard of me through a friend of mine from college. Brad teaches with Barry and Brad and I both went to Nicaragua in 1991 for a short, but incredibly packed trip meeting with the coalition government at the time and the opposition Sandinistas. Brad then went on to teach high school in Latin America and Spain and is now back in the states teaching.
I bring this up as Atrios links to the Alicublog who takes on the most recent bit on the subject by Jonah Goldberg and Glenn Reynolds (whens the last time I even mentioned these two?)
Reynolds and Goldberg take to task this point in the Newsweek article:
Now, NEWSWEEK has learned, the Pentagon is intensively debating an option that dates back to a still-secret strategy in the Reagan administration?s battle against the leftist guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador in the early 1980s. Then, faced with a losing war against Salvadoran rebels, the U.S. government funded or supported “nationalist” forces that allegedly included so-called death squads directed to hunt down and kill rebel leaders and sympathizers. Eventually the insurgency was quelled, and many U.S. conservatives consider the policy to have been a success?despite the deaths of innocent civilians and the subsequent Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages scandal.
Both complain that Nicaragua and El Salvador are different countries so Iran-Contra has nothing to do with El Salvador. The problem with this logic is that it avoids the factual evidence that not only were both efforts a part of a larger strategy, but the operations overlapped quite frequently. From the Walsh investigation into Iran-Contra:
Donald P. Gregg in 1951 began a career of more than 30 years with the Central Intelligence Agency. That service included several overseas postings, including a tour in South Vietnam during the war. In 1979 Gregg was detailed by the CIA to the National Security Council staff, where his responsibilities included Asian affairs and intelligence matters. Following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the new Administration requested that Gregg remain at the NSC. Until 1982, Gregg headed the NSC’s Intelligence Directorate. In August 1982, he resigned from the CIA and accepted the position of national security adviser to Vice President George Bush, holding that position until the end of the Reagan Administration. In early 1989, President Bush nominated Gregg to be U.S. ambassador to the Republic of South Korea. Gregg was confirmed by the Senate for this position on September 12, 1989, and served as ambassador until 1993.
During the Vietnam War, Gregg supervised CIA officer Felix Rodriguez and they kept in contact following the war. Gregg introduced Rodriguez to Vice President Bush in January 1985, and Rodriguez met with the Vice President again in Washington, D.C., in May 1986. He also met Vice President Bush briefly in Miami on May 20, 1986. As a teenager, Rodriguez had participated in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and remained, following that debacle, an ardent anti-communist.
In 1985 and 1986, Rodriguez worked out of the Ilopango air base in El Salvador, where he assisted the Salvadoran Air Force in anti-guerrilla counterinsurgency tactics. In late 1985 and during 1986, Rodriguez — whose alias was “Max Gomez” — became increasingly involved in the contra-resupply effort that was based at Ilopango at that time. Because of Rodriguez’s close association with General Juan Bustillo, who headed the Salvadoran Air Force, Rodriguez was vital to Lt. Col. Oliver L. North’s contra-resupply operation by coordinating flights based at Ilopango.
Following the shootdown of the contra-resupply aircraft carrying American Eugene Hasenfus on October 5, 1986, Rodriguez became a center of public and congressional attention. Because of Rodriguez’s close friendship with Gregg and his three personal meetings with Vice President Bush, questions arose whether the contra-resupply operation was being directed by Gregg through Rodriguez. Questions also arose about when the Vice President’s office became aware of Rodriguez’s and North’s active participation in the contra-resupply operation at Ilopango.
Both Gregg and his deputy, Col. Samuel J. Watson III, were investigated for possible false testimony regarding their denial of knowledge of Rodriguez’s involvement in North’s contra-resupply operation. OIC obtained Watson’s immunized testimony in an effort to further its investigation. Despite unresolved conflicts between documentary evidence and the testimony of the principal witnesses, OIC determined that it could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt a criminal case against Gregg.
Gregg, Rodriguez and North
When Gregg assumed his position as assistant to the Vice President for national security affairs in August 1982, he consciously disassociated himself from former colleagues with whom he had worked during his CIA career. The exception to that rule was Felix Rodriguez. Gregg testified: “. . . I have made it a conscious decision really not to reach back into that part of my life to bring other people forward. Felix is the only exception I have made to that.” 1 Gregg lost track of Rodriguez for a period of time after Vietnam and did not see him until the early 1980s, when Rodriguez came to Washington sporadically and talked with Gregg about old times. Gregg was not certain what Rodriguez was doing at that time, and he did not inquire; however, they remained friends.2
The larger problem is that both Goldberg and Reynolds seem to lose their moral clarity pretty quickly in regard to these events. It’s hard for Brad and I to do after meeting several people who worked as literacy workers or other civilian position tell you of their story of being raped by Contras as a part of the efforts to bring down the Sandinistas. Targeting civilian populations with such torture tactics has a name: Terrorism.
For those who need reminding, the US is supposed to be against terrorism. Death squads or whatever you want to call them, don’t just target insurgents. Their primary aim is to target civilians and scare people into submission.