I let loose on the Illinois Political System
Over at the Political State Report
Call It A Comeback
Kevin also asked about Israeli lying to the US. I don’t really understand the distinction of to one’s face lying as compared to just lying. It seems to me that the first is only important if one is running diplomacy by personal feelings, which is inappropriate in the first place.
Two of the biggest examples are the Pollard spying case (and other instances) and the provision of nuclear technology to South Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
There are numerous examples if one includes misusing US military and non-military aid for forbidden purposes. One of the more egregious examples is the Osirik bombing, a bombing I think was a good idea. However, by the letter of American law and the agreements the US had with Israel such uses of military equipment were forbidden. Reagan made this point far stronger than I ever would have, but it was considered at the time a serious break in the two countries working relationship. We still maintained a strong relationship despite the event or the two events above.
Kevin made some comments and I’m responding to them here–go down to the Navel Gazing post comments for the original discussion. I think his comments posed good questions, though I strongly disagree with him.
I don’t see any evidence that Bush is acting on feelings towards Germany – it’s just Schroeder he can’t stand. But with the end of the cold war, is Germany truly an ally, or just another country we do business with?
Given German soldiers have only fought twice outside of Germany since the end of World War II and both of those wars were American led, I don’t understand why people insist that Germans aren’t allies of the United States. In fact, given the modern German public’s preference for non-military solutions, I find their record remarkably pro-US.
Being an ally doesn’t mean one is a sockpuppet for the other country, it means you share common interests and you work together for those interests. Many times you may not have common strategies and that is just part of the deal.
France is a different deal. During the Cold War France often stuck a stick in the spokes simply because they could. There are times we can work with France, but clearly, we don’t expect them to be there in many cases. Germany isn’t going to be there every time we want to do something because they don’t act as frequently as we do.
As far as not liking Schroeder, so what? The first Bush seemed to have a rather notable dislike of Yitzak Shamir, yet he still worked with him on most issues–except the settlements and Bush was right there. The problem with the current criticisms of Germany is that they are almost entirely ahistorical. Now, some in Germany have the same problem in relation to the US, but why would we exacerbate a relationship that is in our interest? Because we don’t like someone? If that is a criteria we want to go by, there aren’t many world leaders who like George Bush even amongst our stronger allies.
The problem isn’t entirely Schroeder, the vast majority of Germans including the Christian Democrats are against military action in Iraq. Schroeder’s people have exacerbated the problem, but the snits are turning into 3rd grade insults and barbs about who started the snarkiness. All of this was going on while seven Germans died in Afghanistan as part of NATO operations.
Again, if you can’t trust the leader of the country, can you trust that country with that leader, and if you can’t trust the country, can they be an ally?
What is it about Germany we can’t trust? That Schroeder wasn’t completely forthcoming regarding a resolution in the United Nations? I’m terribly confused because Germany was pretty damn clear about their views on Iraq throughout the buildup to the war.
I’m especially troubled if Bush is making policy based on personal relationships. Policy might be furthed by personal relationships, but it shouldn’t be made by those relationships. They have absolutely nothing to do with the security of the United States.
DUH–on all counts. More tomorrow.
BTW, this is only the third campaign committee ever indicted and now convicted. Ryan’s up next.
Go listen.
The dangers of Larry Bird and French Lick–never mind the France family.
Well hell, if we are going to treat this like a ballgame, let’s just do it.
Via Counterspin Central
First, Tariq Aziz became a free agent and signed on with the Kurds.
From Debka it looks like there are significant signs of military defections. If accurate, a lot fewer lives will be lost. God willing.
Reading down all the updates of Counterspin–we have certainly entered the fog of war period.
UP DATE: Oops, he apparently just showed up on Iraqi TV. I’m sure the first of many errors.
Waiting for the war to break out, but TNR writes that much of our problem repairing relationships with our allies other than the French may be hindered by Dubya’s bizarre sense of loyalty.
Diplomacy isn’t about feelings, it is about projecting power.
Via Virginia Postrel:
Somethine I take entirely for granted, the St. Louis Circuit Court Historical Records Project. This is a multi-university project along with multiple state agencies that preserve the Court Records from early in Missouri’s history including the Freedom Suits. Not surprising to those in St. Louis, Wayne Fields has taken a significant role.
The LA Times does a piece on it today.
So Joe Conason calls Cheney a Bircher. Is he right? Pretty much. It is reasonable to argue that the UN isn’t perfect or to even propose a better alternative. However, as with nearly all of this administration’s foreign policy initiatives, the administration is not only trashing an international agreement, arrangement, or institution, but refusing to propose an alternative.
Perhaps that is unfair, the US unilaterally acting or acting with a small number of allies is an alternative, just not a good long term strategy.
It isn’t the criticism of an international institution that is the problem, it is the absolute refusal to offer any alternatives that is quickly pushing away those who should be our allies.
The first is a general recap of the politics of O’Hare Expansion.
The second covers Blagojevich’s inability to put together a Cabinet.