Daniel Drezner argues that the ultimate outcome of the diplomacy isn’t far off of what another strategy might have produced, namely, that UN approval wouldn’t have been given.
I guess I never held UN Approval as the only measure of success, but as a strategy to bring along allies with concerns. We didn’t necessarily have to get UN Approval, but seeking approval should have enabled us to bring along allies who had populations worried about the war.
Pissing on the leg of a great deal of our allies I figured could be avoided, and the administration has done a fine job of drinking extra water to ensure every chance to do so wasn’t wasted. Pissing off the French isn’t exactly the worst thing in the world and an effective strategy, as Drezner points out, would have done accomplished that far better than the current outcome. Instead, we made it harder for our traditional allies to side with us. Dan makes some of these points, but it seems to excuse much of the ineptitude and petty sniping that has characterized the diplomatic effort.
Instead of using this as an opportunity to build a working coalition and show up French intransigence, we made them look reasonable and didn’t build much of a functioning coalition. Such a move would have strengthened our hand for future crises instead of weakening it. While Iraq is important, our allies, alliances, and, yes, even the UN are essential for projecting our values and interests in the international order.
I don’t think Drezner and I are that far apart, except that I started with incredibly low expectations of this administration and even those couldn’t be met.
In the Bush Amen corner:
I think it was a mistake to go the Security Council route. But I think that France’s backstabbing surprised almost everyone, not just the Bush Administration. In retrospect, we probably should have recognized that self-aggrandizing yet self-defeating diplomacy is a French hallmark, and that we shouldn’t have believed French promises.
But you have to give Bush credit — though few will — in that he’s bent over backward to try to let the international system demonstrate relevance and competence. And by doing so he has made abundantly plain that the United Nations is a joke, and that France and Germany are not our friends, but (France, especially) our would-be rivals. And there’s value in that.
That said, I wouldn’t have gone to the Security Council at all. And you can bet that neither the United States, nor any other power, is likely to do so ever again.
Bush bent over backwards? No. Bending over backwards was actual active diplomacy that built upon relationships as Bush’s father did in 1991 and sending out your top people to talk and cajole and offer. Powell didn’t do that and Rumsfeld did a rather amazing job of taking delight in pissing off our allies. This was an exercise in tearing down relationships and it shows. The big deal isn’t the effect on Iraq, it is the effect on the future when we need strong allies.
Maybe there won’t be much permanent damage to our long term allies and alliances. I hope that is the case. But the way this is going the only thing that could go worse is if Tony Blair loses the Prime Minister’s position over this war. Imagine the signal that would send to future British politicians about strongly backing American allies.
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