This Washington Post Editorial is getting a lot of mention today, as it should. There is also Republican movement in the House to focus on a more international effort and unless we want to be occupying Iraq by ourselves, this seems an obviously good idea with the caveat that we control security concerns during occupation.
What is troubling about the noises out the Pentagon is that they seem to think they are going to impose a government on Iraq. That is a really good way to lose the peace in the occupation. While Afghanistan is clearly different and it is unclear how stable it will be in the long run, one excellent choice there was to convene an Afghan assembly to make specific decisions regarding the first transitional government. Ownership in some form of this government would reduce the inevitable arguments from both Islamists and Baathist remnants that the US is occupying Iraq for its own interests.
If democracy is going to take root in Iraq, it must be through a process that incorporates disparate elements of Iraqi society and not disparate elements of the Bush administration.
This should be self-evident, but the idea that Chalabi can return and be influential is problematic to say the least. Josh Marshall covers this from one angle and makes some important points.
There is another issue here and that is how accepting the Iraqi public will be of those who left. After civil wars or other wars dividing countries’ loyalties, those who leave often aren’t particularly welcome by those who stayed. Nicaragua provides a somewhat mediocre comparison, but it is one I’m familiar with in terms of what happened when the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election and turned over power to Chamorro.
The ‘Miami Boys’ were not welcomed back with open arms except financially. Many wealthy Nicaraguans left for Miami and waited out the entire 1980s there. Upon the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas they returned, but even the anti-Sandinistas who were stayed did not care for them. By leaving the Miami Boys missed the hard work of dissenting against a regime that quite often did not tolerate dissent. Those who stayed and fought the Sandinistas politically were much more credible to most Nicaraguans. Assuming that an opportunistic operator will work as a new leader is a very poor assumption.
Perhaps Chalabi isn’t as shady as some suggest and he could be a future leader. If that is the case, then the Iraqi people can make that choice in an election later. For now, the US should look to establish civilian leaders who stayed for an interim government.
Interestingly, Karzai fits a somewhat similar model of someone who was at least around if not consistently in Afghanistan during the civil war periods.